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Abstract - Several years of academic and industrial research
efforts have converged to a common understanding on funda-
mental security building blocks for the upcoming Vehicular
Communication (VC) systems. There is a growing consensus
towards deploying a special-purpose identity and credential
management infrastructure, i.e., a Vehicular Public-Key Infras-
tructure (VPKI), enabling pseudonymous authentication, with
standardization efforts towards that direction. In spite of the
progress made by standardization bodies (IEEE 1609.2 and ETSI)
and harmonization efforts (Car2Car Communication Consortium
(C2C-CC)), significant questions remain unanswered towards
deploying a VPKI. Deep understanding of the VPKI, a central
building block of secure and privacy-preserving VC systems, is
still lacking. This paper contributes to the closing of this gap.
We present SECMACE, a VPKI system, which is compatible
with the IEEE 1609.2 and ETSI standards specifications. We
provide a detailed description of our state-of-the-art VPKI that
improves upon existing proposals in terms of security and privacy
protection, and efficiency. SECMACE facilitates multi-domain
operations in the VC systems and enhances user privacy, notably
preventing linking pseudonyms based on timing information
and offering increased protection even against honest-but-curious
VPKI entities. We propose multiple policies for the vehicle-
VPKI interactions, based on which and two large-scale mobility
trace datasets, we evaluate the full-blown implementation of
SECMACE. With very little attention on the VPKI performance
thus far, our results reveal that modest computing resources can
support a large area of vehicles with very low delays and the most
promising policy in terms of privacy protection can be supported
with moderate overhead.
Index Terms---Vehicular Communications, Security, Privacy,
Identity and Credential Management, Vehicular PKI
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular Communication (VC) systems can generally
enhance transportation safety and efficiency with a gamut
of applications, ranging from collision avoidance alerts to
traffic conditions updates; moreover, they can integrate and
enrich Location Based Services (LBSs) [1, 2] and vehicular
social networks [3], and provide infotainment services. In VC
systems, vehicles are provided with On-Board Units (OBUs)
to communicate with each other (Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V)
communication), or with Roadside Units (RSUs) (Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure (V2I) communication). The deployment of such
a large-scale system cannot materialize unless the security
and privacy of the users are safeguarded [4]. Standardization
bodies (IEEE 1609.2 WG [5] and ETSI [1]) and harmonization
efforts (Car2Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) [6])
have reached a consensus to use Public Key Cryptography
(PKC) to protect the V2V and V2I communications [7]: a
set of Certification Authorities (CAs), constituting the Ve-
hicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI), provide credentials
to legitimate vehicles; each vehicle is provided with a Long
Term Certificate (LTC) (and has the corresponding private
key) to ensure accountable identification of the vehicle. To
achieve unlinkability of messages originating the vehicle, a set
of short-lived anonymized certificates, termed pseudonyms,
are used, along with the corresponding short-term private
keys. The system maintains a mapping of these short-term
identities to the vehicle long-term identity for accountability.
Such ideas were elaborated by the Secure Vehicle Commu-
nication (SeVeCom) project [7, 8] and subsequent projects,
e.g., Crash Avoidance Metrics Partnership Vehicle Safety
Consortium (CAMP VSC3) [9] and Preparing Secure Vehicle-
to-X Communication Systems (PRESERVE) [10], as well as
technical standards, notably the IEEE 1609.2 WG [5], ETSI [1],
and harmonization documents (C2C-CC [6]).
In multi-domain VC systems, each vehicle is registered with
one Long Term CA (LTCA), responsible for issuing its LTC,
and it is able to obtain pseudonyms from any Pseudonym
CA (PCA), a pseudonym provider. Vehicles digitally sign
transmitted messages, e.g., Cooperative Awareness Messages
(CAMs) or Decentralized Environmental Notification Messages
(DENMs), with the private key, kiv, that corresponds to a
currently valid pseudonym, P iv . The pseudonym is then attached
to the signed messages to facilitate verification by any recipient.
Upon reception, the pseudonym is verified (presuming a trust
relationship with the pseudonym provider) before the message
itself (signature validation). This ensures authenticity and
integrity of the message and non-repudiation. Vehicles switch
from one pseudonym (and the corresponding private key) to
another one (ideally, non-previously used) to ensure message
unlinkability (pseudonyms per se are inherently unlinkable if
they are issued appropriately as it will become clear later).
We propose SECMACE, a VPKI system compatible with
standards, which improves the state-of-the-art both in terms of
security and privacy protection, as well as extensive evaluations
of the system. In the following, we describe four technical
aspects of our system that improves over the state-of-the-
art. The VPKI entities are, often implicitly, assumed to be
fully trustworthy. Given the experience from recent mobile
applications, we need to extend the adversarial model from
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2fully trustworthy to honest-but-curious VPKI servers: they are
honest, i.e., thoroughly complying with the best practices,
specified protocols, and system policies, but curious, i.e.,
tempted to infer sensitive user information, thus harming user
privacy. In the context of VC systems, an LTCA should not
know which PCA is targeted, and which pseudonyms are
obtained by which vehicles, and for which period; the PCA
also should not be able to identify the real identity of the
vehicles, or link successive pseudonym requests to a single
vehicle.
We propose a system that prevents misuse of the credentials,
in particular towards a Sybil-based [11] misbehavior: the ac-
quisition of multiple simultaneously valid pseudonyms enables
an attacker to inject multiple erroneous hazard notifications as
if they were originated from multiple vehicles, thus misleading
the system. In the light of a multi-domain VC systems with a
multiplicity of PCAs, each vehicle could obtain pseudonyms
from any PCA. This enables a compromised vehicle to obtain
multiple sets of pseudonyms, valid simultaneously, from
different PCAs, thus operating as a Sybil node. A general
remedy to mitigate such a misbehavior [12] is to issue the
pseudonyms with non-overlapping lifetimes and equip the
vehicles with Hardware Security Modules (HSMs), using which
all outgoing signatures are guaranteed to be signed under the
private key of a single valid pseudonym at any time. However,
our VPKI design, per se, prevents Sybil-based misbehavior in a
multi-domain VC system without presuming trusted hardware.
We further ensure that the pseudonyms themselves are
not inherently linkable based on the timing information: a
transcript of pseudonymously authenticated messages could be
linked simply based on the pseudonym lifetime and issuance
times [13], and requests could act as user ‘‘fingerprints’’ [14].
Simply put, individually determined pseudonym lifetimes allow
an observer to link pseudonyms of the same vehicle only by
inspecting the successive pseudonym lifetimes (without even
examining the content of the message). To mitigate this threat,
we propose a privacy-preserving policy so that the timing
information does not harm user privacy.
We provide three generally applicable policies, including a
privacy-preserving one, for vehicle-VPKI interactions with a
realistic evaluation of the workload that a VPKI would face.
The workload on the VPKI servers mainly depends on the
frequency of vehicle-VPKI interactions and the duration for
which vehicles request pseudonyms for. Towards dimensioning
our VPKI, we investigate the overall effects of these policies
on the actual implementation of our VPKI and we provide an
extensive analysis of the suitability of different representative
policies for vehicle-VPKI interactions. We demonstrate that
SECMACE, as the most promising VPKI in terms of perfor-
mance combined with the most promising policy in terms
of privacy, introduces a very modest overhead. Eventually,
any vehicle could obtain all required pseudonyms within a
short delay, practically in real-time, for its participation in the
system.
SECMACE, a comprehensive security and privacy-
preserving architecture for VC systems, contributes a set
of novel features: (i) multi-domain operation, (ii) increased
user privacy protection, in the presence of honest-but-curious
system entities even with limited collusion, and by eliminating
pseudonym linking based on timing information, (iii) thwart-
ing Sybil-based misbehavior, and (iv) multiple pseudonym
acquisition policies. Beyond these features, we provide an
extensive survey of the prior art and a detailed security
and privacy analysis of our system. We further provide
an extensive evaluation of the overall system performance
including alternative pseudonym acquisition policies, and
assessing its efficiency, scalability, and robustness based on
an implementation of our VPKI and two large-scale mobility
traces.
In the rest of the paper, we describe the related work (Sec. II)
and the problem statement (Sec. III). We then explain our
system entities and model with detailed security protocols
(Sec. IV). We describe the security and privacy analysis
(Sec. V), followed by the extensive experimental evaluation
(Sec. VI) before the conclusion (Sec. VII).
II. RELATED WORK
Pseudonymous authentication was elaborated by
SeVeCom [7, 8], PRESERVE [10], CAMP VSC3 [9,
24], standardization bodies (IEEE 1609.2 and ETSI), and
harmonization efforts (C2C-CC [6]). Several proposals follow
the C2C-CC architecture, e.g., PRESERVE [10, 22], entailing
direct LTCA-PCA communication during the pseudonym
acquisition process. This implies that the LTCA can learn the
targeted PCA. As a consequence, the LTCA can link the real
identity of the vehicle with its corresponding pseudonyms
based on the timing information [13]: the exact time of request
could be unique, or one of few, and thus linkable by the
LTCA, as it might be unlikely in a specific region to have
multiple requests at a specific instance.
A ticket based approach was proposed in [20, 21, 23]: the
LTCA issues authenticated, yet anonymized, tickets for the
vehicles to obtain pseudonyms from a PCA. There is no direct
LTCA-PCA communication and the PCA does not learn any
user-related information through the pseudonym acquisition
process. However, the LTCA can still learn when and from
which PCA the vehicle shall obtain pseudonyms during the
ticket issuance phase, because this information will be presented
(by the vehicle) and will be included in the authenticated ticket
(by the LTCA). The pseudonym acquisition period can be used
to infer the active vehicle operation period, and the targeting
PCA could be used to infer a rough location (assuming the
vehicle chooses the nearest PCA) or the affiliation (assuming
the vehicle can only obtain pseudonyms from the PCA it is
affiliated to, or operating in) of the vehicle.
A common issue for all schemes proposed in the literature
is that the PCA can trivially link the pseudonyms issued for
a vehicle as a response to a single pseudonym request [18,
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25]. CAMP VSC3 [9, 24] proposes a
proxy-based scheme that the registration authority (a proxy
to validate, process, and forward pseudonym requests to the
PCA) aggregates and shuffles all requests within a large period
of time before forwarding them to the PCA, so that the PCA
cannot identify which pseudonyms belong to which vehicles.
Our system can also be configured to prevent an honest-but-
3TABLE I
VPKI SECURITY FEATURES AND PROPERTIES COMPARISON (X: SUPPORT, ×: NO SUPPORT)
````````````Schemes
Properties
IEEE 1609.2
compliance
ETSI
compliance
Long-term
identifier
Multiple
domain
Sybil
resilience Cryptosystem Cryptographic algorithms Revocation Accountability
Perfect
forward
privacy
Refilling strategy V↔VPKI communication
Fischer et al. (SRAAC) [15] × × Certificate × × PKC
Magic-ink signature
with DSS X X × On-demand
Blind signature
without confidentiality
Sha et al. [16] × × Certificate X × PKC
ECC public key
cryptography and RSA X X — On-demand
Symmetric-key cryptography
(session key)
SeVeCom [7, 17] × × Certificate × X PKC ECDSA X X × Preloading Secure wireline communication
C2C-CC pilot PKI [6] X X Certificate X × PKC ECDSA × X × Preloading DL/ECIES over UDP
Studer et al. (TACK) [18] × × Groupuser key X X GS/PKC ECDSA and VLR GS X X X On-demand GS without confidentiality
Schaub et al. (V-tokens) [19] × × Certificate X X PKC — × X — On-demand
Blind signature scheme &
anonymous communication
channel (e.g., onion routing)
Alexiou et al. (VeSPA) [20, 21] X × Certificate X × PKC ECDSA X X × On-demand SSL/TLS
PRESERVE [10] X X Certificate × × PKC ECDSA X X × Preloading DL/ECIES over UDP
Bißmeyer et al. (CoPRA) [22] X X Certificate X × PKC ECDSA & ECIES × X × On-demand DL/ECIES over UDP
Gisdakis et al. (SEROSA) [23] X × Certificate X × PKC ECDSA X X × On-demand SSL/TLS
Whyte et al. (CAMP VSC3) [9, 24] X × Certificate X × PKC
Butterfly key
expansion cryptography X X X Preloading
Asymmetric cryptography
over UDP
Fo¨rster et al. (PUCA) [25] × × Certificate X X ZKP/PKC
ECDSA, Dynamic
accumulator and
CL signature
× × × On-demand SSL/TLS over Tor
Khodaei et al. (SECMACE) X × Certificate X X PKC ECDSA X X X On-demand SSL/TLS
Sun et al. [26] × ×
Group
user key × × GS
Short GS with
provably-secure ID-based
signature scheme
X X X On-demand —
Guo et al. [27] × × Groupuser key X × GS
Short GS with optimization:
probabilistic verification
of signatures
X X X Annual preloading Off-line annual renewal keys
Lin et al. (GSIS) [28] × × Groupuser key X × GS
GS and
ID-based signature X X X On-demand —
Wasef et al. (ECMV) [29] × × Groupuser key X × GS
Bilinear &
ID-based cryptography X X X On-demand
Encrypted tunnel leveraging
asymmetric cryptography
Wasef et al. (PPGCV) [30] × × Groupuser key × × GS
Group key
cryptography X X X On-demand —
Lu et al. (ECPP) [31] × × Groupuser key X × GS
GS & bilinear
pairing-based cryptography X X X On-demand Non-secure 5.9 GHz DSRC
Calandriello et al. [32] × × Groupuser key × X Hybrid ECDSA and VLR GS X X X On-demand SSL/TLS
curious PCA from linking a set of pseudonyms issued for a
vehicle (as discussed in Sec. V).
The idea of enforcing non-overlapping pseudonym lifetimes
was first proposed in [12]. The motivation is to prevent an
adversary from equipping itself with multiple valid identities,
and thus affecting protocols of collection of multiple inputs,
e.g., based on voting, by sending out redundant false, yet
authenticated, information, e.g., fake traffic congestion alerts,
or fake misbehavior detection votes [33]. Though this idea
has been accepted, a number of proposals [20, 21, 22, 23]
do not prevent a vehicle from obtaining simultaneously valid
pseudonyms via multiple pseudonym requests. The existence of
multiple PCAs deteriorate the situation: a vehicle could request
pseudonyms from multiple PCAs, e.g., by requesting multiple
tickets from the LTCA or reusing a ticket, while each PCA is
not aware whether pseudonyms for the same period were issued
by any other PCA. [19] prevents a vehicle from obtaining
multiple simultaneously valid pseudonyms by enabling the
PCAs communicating with each other, e.g., a distributed hash
table. SECMACE (including its predecessor work [13, 14])
prevents Sybil-based misbehavior on the infrastructure side
without the need for an additional entity, i.e., extra interactions
or intra-VPKI communications. More specifically, it ensures
that each vehicle can only have one valid pseudonym at any
time in a multi-domain environment: the LTCA maintains a
record of ticket acquisitions for each vehicle, thus preventing
a vehicle from obtaining multiple simultaneously valid tickets.
Beyond the standards specifications (classic PKC), there
have been proposals to use anonymous authentication by
leveraging Group Signatures (GS) [34, 35]. Each group member
is equipped with a group public key, common to all the group
members, and a distinct group signing key. Group signing
keys can be used to sign messages and these signatures can
be verified with the group public key. The signer is kept
anonymous as its signatures (even the signatures of two
identical messages) cannot be linked. A group signing key
itself can be used to sign outgoing messages [28]. However,
GS themselves exhibit high computational delay to sign VC
messages [32]. For example, the signing delay with Group
Signatures with Verifier Local Revocation (GS-VLR) [34] is
around 67 times higher than that with the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)-256, and the verification delay
with the former one is around 11 times higher than that of
the latter (for the same security level, i.e., 128 bits) [32]. [25]
proposes a fully anonymous scheme using Zero Knowledge
Proofs (ZKPs) for the vehicle-PCA authentication with the
consequence that compromised OBUs can be revoked only
‘‘manually’’ with involvement of the owners.
This naturally leads us to the protocol of a hybrid ap-
proach [18, 32, 36]. In [32], a vehicle generates public/private
key pairs and ‘‘self-certifies’’ the public keys on-the-fly with
its own group signing key to be used as the pseudonyms. Such
schemes eliminate the need to request pseudonyms from the
VPKI repeatedly. Upon reception of messages signed under a
new pseudonym, the GS and the pseudonym are verified before
the message itself (signature validation); if the pseudonym
is cached, only the signatures of the messages need to be
verified. Performance improvement relies on the lifetime of
each pseudonym: the longer the pseudonym lifetime is, the less
frequent pseudonym verifications are needed. However, this
trades off the linkability of the messages that are signed under
the same pseudonym. Moreover, allowing a vehicle to generate
its own pseudonyms also makes Sybil-based misbehavior
possible. In [18], a vehicle requests a new pseudonym every
4time it enters a new region. A pseudonym request is signed
with the group signing key of the vehicle, thus it is kept
anonymous. Sybil-based misbehavior is prevented by fixing
the random number (which is changed periodically) that used
for GS generations. Therefore, a vehicle cannot request two
pseudonyms through two pseudonym requests with the same
random number. However, it presumes that the random number
should be negotiated and bound to the vehicle before requesting
pseudonyms, while it is unclear how this can be done without
disclosing the vehicle identity.
Table I shows a comparison of all, to the best of our
knowledge, existing proposals for a VPKI or its main building
blocks with respect to their security properties. Only a few of
the works evaluated the performance of their implementation
while in the light of the VC large-scale multi-domain envi-
ronment, the efficiency and scalability of a VPKI should be
extensively evaluated. In this paper, we extensively evaluate the
performance of the full-blown implementation of our VPKI.
Beyond the scope of this paper, SECMACE can be highly
beneficial in other application domains, e.g., secure and privacy-
preserving LBS provision [37].
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. System Model and Assumptions
We assume that a VPKI consists of a set of authorities
with distinct roles: the Root CA (RCA), the highest-level
authority, certifies other lower-level authorities; the LTCA is
responsible for the vehicle registration and the LTC issuance;
the PCA issues pseudonyms for the registered vehicles; and
the Resolution Authority (RA) is able to initiate a process to
resolve a pseudonym, thus identifying the long-term identity
of a (misbehaving, malfunctioning, or outdated [38]) vehicle,
i.e., the pseudonym owner. We further assume that each
vehicle is only registered to its Home-LTCA (H-LTCA), the
policy decision and enforcement point, and is reachable by
the registered vehicles in its domain. A domain is defined as
a set of vehicles, registered with their H-LTCA, subject to
the same administrative regulations and policies [39]. Each
domain is governed by only one H-LTCA, while there are
several PCAs active in one or multiple domains. Each vehicle,
depending on the policies and rules, can cross to foreign
domains and communicate with the Foreign-LTCA (F-LTCA)
towards obtaining pseudonyms. Trust between two domains
can be established with the help of an RCA, or through cross
certification between them. All vehicles registered in the system
are provided with HSMs, ensuring that private keys never
leave the HSM. We assume that the certificates of higher-
level authorities are installed on the OBUs, which are loosely
synchronized with the VPKI servers.
B. Adversarial Model
We adhere to the assumed adversarial behavior defined in
the literature [4] and in this paper, we are primarily concerned
with adversaries that seek to abuse the VPKI. Nonetheless, we
consider a stronger adversarial model: rather than assuming
fully trustworthy VPKI entities, we consider them to be
honest-but-curious. Such servers correctly execute the security
protocols, but the servers function towards collecting or
inferring user sensitive information based on the execution
of the protocols. Such honest-but-curious VPKI servers could
link pseudonym sets provided to the users, through the VPKI
operations, e.g., pseudonyms issuance, thus, tracing vehicle
activities. Our adversarial model considers multiple VPKI
servers collude, i.e., share information that each of them
individually infers with the others, to harm user privacy. The
nature of collusion can vary, e.g., depending on who is the
owner or administrator of any two or more colluding servers.
We analyze the effects of collusion by different VPKI entities
in Sec. V-A.
In a multi-PCA environment, internal adversaries, i.e.,
malicious (compromised) clients, raise two challenges. First,
they could obtain multiple simultaneously valid pseudonyms,
thus misbehaving each as multiple registered legitimate-looking
vehicles. Second, they can degrade the operations of the
system by mounting a clogging Denial of Service (DoS)
attack against the VPKI servers. External adversaries, i.e.
unauthorized entities, can try to harm the system operations by
launching a DoS (or a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)),
thus degrading the availability of the system. But they are
unable to successfully forge messages or ‘crack’ the employed
cryptosystems and cryptographic primitives.
C. Security and Privacy Requirements
The security and privacy requirements for the V2V and V2I
(V2X) communications are described in the literature [4]. Here,
we only focus on the security and privacy requirements on
vehicle-VPKI interactions, intra-VPKI actions, and relevant
requirements in the face of honest-but-curious VPKI entities.
• R1. Authentication and communication integrity, and
confidentiality: All vehicle-VPKI interactions should be
authenticated, i.e., both interacting entities should corrobo-
rate the sender of a message and the liveness of the sender.
We further need to ensure the communication integrity,
i.e., exchanged messages should be protected from any
alternation. To provide confidentiality, the content of
sensitive information, e.g., exchanged messages between
a vehicle and a VPKI entity to obtain pseudonyms, should
be kept secret from other entities.
• R2. Authorization and access control: Only legitimate,
i.e., registered, and authenticated vehicles should be able
to be serviced by the VPKI, notably obtain pseudonyms.
Moreover, vehicles should interact with the VPKI entities
according to the system protocols and policies, and domain
regulations.
• R3. Non-repudiation, accountability and eviction (revo-
cation): All relevant operation and interactions with the
VPKI entities should be non-repudiable, i.e., no entity
should be able to deny having sent a message. Moreover,
all legitimate system entities, i.e., registered vehicles and
VPKI entities, should be accountable for their actions that
could interrupt the operation of the VPKI or harm the
vehicles. In case of any deviation from system policies, the
misbehaving entities should be evicted from the system.
• R4. Anonymity (conditional): Vehicles should participate
in the VC system anonymously, i.e., vehicles should
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4. psnyms acquisition
IV. psnym req.
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Fig. 1. Pseudonym acquisition overview in the home and foreign domains.
communicate with others without revealing their long-
term identifiers and credentials. Anonymity is conditional
in the sense that the corresponding long-term identity
can be retrieved by the VPKI entities, and accordingly
revoked, if a vehicle deviates from system policies, e.g.,
submitting faulty information.
• R5. Unlinkability: In order to achieve unlinkability, the
real identity of a vehicle should not be linked to its
corresponding pseudonyms; in other words, the LTCA,
should know neither the targeted PCA nor the actual
pseudonym acquisition periods, nor the credentials them-
selves. Moreover, successive pseudonym requests should
not be linked to the same requester and to each other. The
PCA should not be able to retrieve the long-term identity
of any requester, or link multiple pseudonym requests (of
the same requester). Furthermore, an external observer
should not be able to link pseudonyms of a specific vehicle
based on information they carry, notably their timing
information1. In order to achieve full unlinkability, which
results in perfect forward privacy, no single entity (even
the PCA) should be able to link a set of pseudonyms
issued for a vehicle as a response to a single request.
The level of anonymity and unlinkability is highly
dependent on the anonymity set, i.e., the number of
active participants and the resultant number of requests
to obtain pseudonyms, e.g., all vehicles serviced by one
PCA; because pseudonyms carry the issuer information,
the VPKI should enhance user privacy by rendering any
inference (towards linking, thus tracking, vehicles) hard.
• R6. Thwarting Sybil-based attacks: The VPKI should not
issue multiple simultaneously valid pseudonyms for any
vehicle.
• R7. Availability: The VPKI should remain operational in
the presence of benign failures (system faults or crashes)
and be resilient to resource depletion attacks, e.g., DDoS
attack.
IV. SECURITY SYSTEM ENTITIES AND DESIGN
A. System Overview
Fig. 1 illustrates our VPKI assuming two distinct domains:
the home domain (A) and a foreign domain (B). In the
1This does not relate to location information that vehicular communication
messages, time- and geo-stamped signed under specific pseudonyms, carry.
registration phase, each H-LTCA registers vehicles within
its domain and maintains their long-term identities. At the
bootstrapping phase, each vehicle needs to discover the VPKI-
related information, e.g., the available PCAs in its home
domain, or the desired F-LTCA and PCAs in a foreign domain,
along with their corresponding certificates. To facilitate the
overall intra-domain and multi-domain operations, a vehicle
first finds such information from a Lightweight Directory
Access Protocol (LDAP) [40] server. This is carried out without
disclosing the real identity of the vehicle. The vehicle, i.e., the
OBU, ‘‘decides’’ when to trigger the pseudonym acquisition
process based on different parameters, e.g., the number of
remaining valid pseudonyms, the residual trip duration, and
the networking connectivity. We presume connectivity to the
VPKI, e.g., via RSUs; should the connectivity be intermittent,
the OBU could initiate pseudonym provisioning proactively
when there is connectivity.
The H-LTCA authenticates and authorizes vehicles, which
authenticate the H-LTCA over a mutually authenticated Trans-
port Layer Security (TLS) [41] tunnel. This way the vehicle
obtains a native ticket (n-tkt) from its H-LTCA while the
targeted PCA or the actual pseudonym acquisition period is
hidden from the H-LTCA; the ticket is anonymized and it does
not reveal its owner’s identity (Protocol 1). The ticket is then
presented to the intended PCA, over a unidirectional (server-
only) authenticated TLS, for the vehicle to obtain pseudonyms
(Protocol 2).
When the vehicle travels in a foreign domain, it should
obtain new pseudonyms from a PCA operating in that domain;
otherwise, the vehicle would stand out with pseudonyms from
another PCA. The vehicle first requests a foreign ticket (f -tkt)
from its H-LTCA (without revealing its targeted F-LTCA) so
that the vehicle can be authenticated and authorized by the
F-LTCA. In turn, the F-LTCA provides the vehicle with a
new ticket (n-tkt), which is native within the domain of the
F-LTCA to be used for pseudonym acquisition in that (foreign)
domain. The vehicle then interacts with its desired PCA to
obtain pseudonyms. Obtaining an f -tkt is transparent to the
H-LTCA: the H-LTCA cannot distinguish between native and
foreign ticket requests. This way, the PCA in the foreign
domain cannot distinguish native requesters from the foreign
ones. For liability attribution, our scheme enables the RA, with
the help of the PCA and the LTCA, to initiate a resolution
process, i.e., to resolve a pseudonym to its long-term identity.
Each vehicle can interact with any PCA, within its home or
a foreign domain, to fetch the Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) [42] and perform Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP) [43] operations, authenticated with a current valid
pseudonym.
B. Pseudonym Acquisition Policies
The choice of policy for obtaining pseudonyms has diverse
ramifications: on the VPKI performance as well as the user
privacy. The policy determines the volume of the workload
(pseudonym requests and related computation and communica-
tion latencies) imposed to the VPKI. The timing of requests
can reveal information that could allow linking pseudonyms.
6TABLE II
NOTATION USED IN THE PROTOCOLS
(P iv)pca, P
i
v a pseudonym signed by the PCA
(LKv, Lkv) long-term public/private key pairs
(Kiv, k
i
v)
pseudonymous public/private key pairs,
corresponding to current valid pseudonym
Idreq, Idres request/response identifiers
Idca Certification Authority unique identifier
LTC Long Term Certificate
(msg)σv a signed message with the vehicle’s private key
N,Rnd nonce, a random number
tnow, ts, te fresh/current, starting, and ending timestamps
tdate timestamp of a specific day
n-tkt, (n-tkt)ltca native ticket
f -tkt, (f -tkt)ltca foreign ticket
H() hash function
Sign(Lk,msg) signing a message with the private key (Lk)
V erify(LTC,msg) verifying a message with the public key (in the LTC)
τP pseudonym lifetime
ΓPx interacting period/interval with the VPKI for policy x
IK identifiable key
V vehicle
ζ, χ, ξ temporary variables
To systematically investigate the effect of diverse on-demand
pseudonym acquisition methods, here we define three specific
representatives, first proposed in [14].
User-controlled (User-defined) Policy (P1): A vehicle
requests pseudonyms for its residual (ideally entire) trip
duration at the start of trip. We presume each vehicle precisely
estimates the trip duration in advance, e.g., based on automotive
navigation systems, previous trips, or user input. The PCA
determines the pseudonym lifetime, either fixed for all vehicles
or flexible for each requester. Additional pseudonyms should
be requested if the actual trip duration exceeds the estimated
one, to ensure that the vehicle is always equipped with enough
valid pseudonyms throughout the entire trip.
Oblivious Policy (P2): The vehicle interacts with the VPKI
every ΓP2 seconds (determined by the PCA and fixed for all
users) and it requests pseudonyms for the entire ΓP2 time
interval; this continues until the vehicle reaches its destination.
This results in over-provisioning of pseudonyms only during
the last iteration. The difference, in comparison to P1, is that
either the vehicle does not know the exact trip duration, or, it
does not attempt to estimate, or possibly, overestimate it; thus,
P2 is oblivious to the trip duration.
Universally Fixed Policy (P3): The H-LTCA, as the policy
decision point in its domain, has predetermined universally
fixed interval, ΓP3, and pseudonym lifetime, τP . At the start of
its trip, a vehicle requests pseudonyms for the ‘‘current’’ ΓP3,
out of which useful (non-expired) ones are actually obtained
for the residual trip duration within ΓP3. For the remainder
of the trip, the vehicle requests pseudonyms for the entire
ΓP3 at each time. This policy issues time-aligned pseudonyms
for all vehicles; thus, timing information does not harm user
privacy. With P3, if the vehicle can estimate the trip duration,
it can obtain all required pseudonyms at the start of its trip
by interacting with the VPKI multiple times. However, if
the vehicle does not attempt to estimate the trip duration, it
Protocol 1 Ticket Provisioning from the H-LTCA
V : P1: (ts, te)← (ts, te) (1)
P2: (ts, te)← (ts,ΓP2) (2)
P3: (ts, te)← (tdate + ΓiP3, tdate + Γi+1P3 ) (3)
V : ζ ← (Idreq, H(Idpca‖Rndn-tkt), ts, te) (4)
V : (ζ)σv ← Sign(Lkv, ζ) (5)
V → H-LTCA : ((ζ)σv , LTCv, N, tnow) (6)
H-LTCA : Verify(LTCv, (ζ)σv ) (7)
H-LTCA : IKn-tkt ← H(LTCv||ts||te||RndIKn-tkt ) (8)
H-LTCA : χ← (H(Idpca‖Rndn-tkt), IKn-tkt, ts, te) (9)
H-LTCA : (n-tkt)σh-ltca ← Sign(Lkh-ltca, χ) (10)
V ← H-LTCA : (Idres, (n-tkt)σh-ltca , RndIKn-tkt , N+1, tnow) (11)
V : Verify(LTCh-ltca, (n-tkt)σh-ltca ) (12)
V : H(LTCv||ts||te||RndIKn-tkt )
?
= IKn-tkt (13)
should interact with the VPKI servers every ΓP3 seconds to
obtain pseudonyms. A strict limitation in using this policy
is that partial pseudonym acquisition in ΓiP3 is not allowed,
i.e., the vehicle must request pseudonyms for the entire ΓiP3.
The reasons are twofold: (i) the PCA should not distinguish
among different requests, and (ii) if the vehicle needs more
pseudonyms during the same ΓiP3, it cannot request yet another
ticket because the H-LTCA only issues one ticket for a single
vehicle for each ΓiP3.
C. VPKI Services and Security Protocols
In this section, we provide the detailed description of
the protocols using the notation in Table II. For Unified
Modeling Language (UML) diagrams of the security and
privacy protocols, we refer the reader to our prior work [13].
Ticket Acquisition (Protocol 1): Assume the OBU decides
to obtain pseudonyms from a specific PCA. If the relevant
policy is P1, each vehicle estimates the trip duration [ts, te]
(step 1.1, i.e., step 1 in Protocol 1). While with P2, each vehicle
requests pseudonyms for [ts, ts+ΓP2] (step 1.2). If the relevant
policy is P3, the vehicle calculates the trip duration based on the
date of travel, tdate, and the actual time of travel corresponding
to the universally fixed interval ΓP3 of that specific PCA
(step 1.3). Then, the vehicle prepares a request and calculates
the hash value of the concatenation of its desired PCA identity
and a random number, i.e., H(Idpca‖Rndn-tkt) (step 1.4). This
conceals the targeted PCA, the actual pseudonym acquisition
periods, and the choice of policy from the LTCA. In case of
cross-domain operation, the vehicle interacts with the H-LTCA
to obtain an f -tkt and it concatenates its targeted F-LTCA
(instead of the desired PCA) and a random number. The vehicle
then signs the request (step 1.5) and sends it to its H-LTCA to
obtain an n-tkt (step 1.6). Upon a successful validation of the
LTC and verification of the request (step 1.7), the H-LTCA
generates the ‘‘ticket identifiable key’’ (IKn-tkt) to bind the
ticket to the LTC: H(LTCv||ts||te||RndIKn-tkt) (steps 1.8);
this prevents the H-LTCA from mapping the ticket to a different
LTC during resolution process. The H-LTCA then issues an
anonymous ticket, (n-tkt)σh-ltca (step 1.9-1.10). The ticket is
anonymous in the sense it does not reveal the actual identity of
its owner, i.e., the H-LTCA issues tickets without the provided
7Protocol 2 Pseudonym Provisioning from the PCA
V : ζ ← (Idreq, Rndn-tkt, t′s, t′e, (n-tkt)σh-ltca ,
{(K1v)σk1v , . . . , (K
n
v )σknv
}, N, tnow) (1)
V → PCA : (ζ) (2)
PCA : Verify(LTCltca, (n-tkt)σltca ) (3)
PCA : H(Idthis-pca‖Rndn-tkt) ?= H(Idpca‖Rndn-tkt) (4)
PCA : P1 or P2: [t′s, t
′
e]
?
⊆ ([ts, te])n-tkt (5)
P3: [t′s, t
′
e]
?
= ([ts, te])n-tkt (6)
PCA : for i← 1, n do (7)
PCA : Verify(Kiv, (K
i
v)σkiv
) (8)
PCA : IKPiv
← H(IKn-tkt||Kiv||tis||tie||RndIKPiv
) (9)
PCA : ξ ← (Kiv, IKPiv , t
i
s, t
i
e) (10)
PCA : (P iv)σpca ← Sign(Lkpca, ξ) (11)
PCA : end for (12)
V ← PCA : (Idres, {(P 1v )σpca , . . . , (Pnv )σpca}, (13)
{RndIK
P1v
, . . . , RndIKPnv
}, N+1, tnow)
V : for i← 1, n do (14)
V : Verify(LTCpca, P
i
v) (15)
V : H(IKn-tkt||Kiv||tis||tie||RndIKPiv
)
?
= IKPiv
(16)
V : end for (17)
ticket revealing the actual identity of the requester. Thus, the
PCA cannot infer the actual identity of the ticket owner, or
distinguish between two tickets, even if the two tickets come
from the same vehicle. Next, the H-LTCA delivers the ticket
to the vehicle (step 1.11). Finally, the vehicle verifies the
ticket and IKn-tkt (steps 1.12-1.13). In case of cross-domain
operation, the vehicle interacts with the F-LTCA and presents
the f -tkt to obtain an n-tkt in the foreign domain. Thus, it
can interact with the PCAs within the foreign domain as a
‘‘local’’ vehicle.
Pseudonym Acquisition (Protocol 2): With an n-tkt at
hand, the vehicle interacts with the targeted PCA to obtain
pseudonyms. The vehicle initiates a protocol to generate the
required ECDSA public/private key pairs (which could be
generated off-line) and sends a request to the PCA (steps 2.1-
2.2). Upon reception and successful ticket verification (step 2.3),
the PCA verifies the targeted PCA (step 2.4), and whether or
not the actual period of requested pseudonyms (i.e., [t′s, t
′
e])
falls within the period specified in the ticket (i.e., [ts, te]):
[t′s, t
′
e] ⊆ ([ts, te])n-tkt for P1 or P2, or [t′s, t′e] = ([ts, te])n-tkt
for P3 (steps 2.5-2.6). Then, the PCA initiates a proof-of-
possession protocol to verify the ownership of the correspond-
ing private keys, kiv.
2 The PCA generates the ‘‘pseudonym
identifiable key’’ (IKP iv ) to bind the pseudonyms to the ticket;
this prevents the compromised (malicious) PCA from mapping
the pseudonyms to a different ticket during the resolution
process. It then issues the pseudonyms (steps 2.7-2.12), and
delivers the response (step 2.13). Finally, the vehicle verifies
the pseudonyms and IKP iv (steps 2.14-2.17).
Pseudonym Resolution and Revocation (Protocol 3): The
2As an optimization, the PCA can probabilistically verify (Kiv)σkiv
.
Protocol 3 Pseudonym Resolution and Revocation
RA : ζ ← (Idreq, P iv) (1)
RA : (ζ)σra ← Sign(Lkra, ζ) (2)
RA→ PCA : ((ζ)σra , LTCra, N, tnow) (3)
PCA : Verify(LTCra, (ζ)σra ) (4)
PCA : {n-tkt, RndIK
Piv
} ← Resolve(P iv) (5)
PCA : Idreq
?
= ‘revoke’: Add(P iv, CRL) (6)
PCA : χ← (Idres, n-tkt, RndIK
Piv
) (7)
PCA : (χ)σpca ← Sign(Lkpca, χ) (8)
RA← PCA : ((χ)σpca , N+1, tnow) (9)
RA : Verify(LTCpca, χ) (10)
RA : H(IKn-tkt||Kiv||tis||tie||RndIKPiv
)
?
= IKPiv
(11)
RA : ResolveLTC(n-tkt) (12)
Protocol 4 LTC Resolution and Revocation
RA : ζ ← (Idreq, n/f -tkt,N, tnow) (13)
RA : (ζ)σra ← Sign(Lkra, ζ) (14)
RA→ H-LTCA : ((ζ)σra , LTCra) (15)
H-LTCA : Verify(LTCra, (ζ)σra ) (16)
H-LTCA : {LTCv, RndIKn-tkt} ← Resolve(n/f -tkt) (17)
H-LTCA : Idreq
?
= ‘revoke’: Add(LTCv, CRL) (18)
H-LTCA : χ← (Idres, LTCv, RndIKn-tkt , N+1, tnow) (19)
H-LTCA : (χ)σh-ltca ← Sign(Lkh-ltca, χ) (20)
RA← H-LTCA : (χ)σh-ltca (21)
RA : Verify(LTCh-ltca, χ) (22)
RA : H(LTCv||ts||te||RndIKn-tkt )
?
= IKn/f -tkt (23)
RA requests the PCA to map the pseudonym to the correspond-
ing ticket, i.e., n-tkt, which the PCA has stored (steps 3.1-3.3).
The PCA verifies the request and maps the pseudonym to
the corresponding n-tkt (steps 3.4-3.5). If needed, the PCA
includes all the valid (non-expired) pseudonyms, issued for
this ticket, to the CRL, thus evicting the misbehaving vehicle
from the system (step 3.6). Then, it sends the n-tkt to the RA
(steps 3.7-3.9). The RA verifies the response and calculates
the IKP iv to confirm that the PCA has correctly resolved the
pseudonym to the corresponding n-tkt (steps 3.10-3.11). The
output of this process is the n-tkt; in case of a cross-domain
resolution, one additional interaction is needed to resolve the
foreign ticket, the f -tkt. As a continuation, the RA resolves the
ticket with the help of the corresponding H-LTCA (step 3.12,
detailed in Protocol 4).
LTC Resolution and Revocation (Protocol 4): The RA
queries the corresponding H-LTCA to have the vehicle identi-
fied, i.e., resolving the LTC of the vehicle. The RA prepares
a request and sends the ticket serial number to H-LTCA
(steps 4.13-4.15). Upon the request verification, the H-LTCA
resolves, and possibly revokes, the LTC corresponding to the
n-tkt (steps 4.16-4.18). The H-LTCA delivers the response
back to the RA (steps 4.19-4.21). Upon reception of the
response, the RA verifies the signature and confirms if the
H-LTCA has mapped the correct LTCv by validating the IK
(steps 4.22-4.23).
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INFORMATION HELD BY HONEST-BUT-CURIOUS ENTITIES
Honest-but-curious (colluding) Entities Information Leaked Security and Privacy Implications
H-LTCA idH, ts, te An H-LTCA knows during when the registered vehicles wish to obtain pseudonyms.
PCAHi ts, te, PHi A PCA in the home domain can link the pseudonyms it issued for a same request, but it cannot link those for different requests.
H-LTCA, F -LTCA idH, idF , ts, te Collusion among LTCAs from different domains does not reveal additional information.
PCAH , PCAF ts, te, PH, PF Collusion among PCAs from different domains does not reveal additional information.
H-LTCA, PCAH idH, ts, te, PH The pseudonyms they issued can be linked and the vehicle identities within the same domain can be derived.
F -LTCA, PCAF idF , ts, te, PF The pseudonyms they issued can be linked but the real identities of the vehicles cannot be derived.
H-LTCA, F -LTCA, PCAF idH, idF , ts, te, PF
Colluding H-LTCAs, F-LTCA and PCAF can link the pseudonyms issued in the foreign domain with the
real identities of the vehicles if the PCAF is the issuer of the pseudonyms.
H-LTCA, F -LTCA, PCAF , PCAF idH, idF , ts, te, PH, PF
Colluding H-LTCAs, F-LTCA, PCAH and PCAF can link the pseudonyms issued in the home and foreign domains
with the real identities of the vehicles if the PCAH and PCAF are the issuers of the pseudonyms.
V,H-LTCA, F -LTCA, PCAF , PCAF idH, idF , ts, te, PH, PF Colluding vehicle, H-LTCA, F-LTCA, PCAH , and PCAF could result in generating invalid IKn/f -tkt, IKn-tkt, or IKPv, respectively.
V. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
We analyze the achieved security and privacy of our VPKI
with respect to the requirements presented in Sec. III-C.
All the communication runs over secure channels, i.e., TLS
with uni- or bidirectional authentication, thus we achieve
authentication, communication integrity and confidentiality
(R1). The H-LTCA authenticates and authorizes the vehicles
based on the registration and their revocation status, and makes
appropriate decisions. It grants a service-granting ticket, thus
enabling the vehicles to request pseudonyms from any PCA
by presenting its anonymous ticket. The PCA then grants the
service, based on prior established trust, by validating the ticket
(R2). Given the ticket acquisition request is signed with the
private key corresponding to the vehicle’s LTC and pseudonym
acquisition entails a valid ticket, the system provides non-
repudiation and accountability (R3). Moreover, the LTCA
and the PCA calculate ticket and pseudonym identifiable keys
(IKtkt and IKP ) to bind them to the corresponding LTC and
ticket respectively (R3).
According to the protocol design, the vehicle conceals the
identity of its targeted PCA with H(Idpca||Rndn-tkt), and the
targeted F-LTCA when operating in a foreign domain. With
P1 and P2, the vehicle hides the actual pseudonym acquisition
periods, i.e. [t′s, t
′
e], while only [ts, te] is revealed to the LTCA.
With P3, requesting intervals fall within the ‘‘universally’’
fixed ΓP3 (along with aligned pseudonyms lifetimes); thus
timing information cannot be used to link two successive
pseudonyms as they are time-aligned with those of all other
active vehicles that obtain pseudonyms by the same PCA
(R4, R5). This is further discussed in Sec. V-B. Moreover,
the separation of duties between the LTCA and the PCA
provides conditional anonymity, but revoked under special
circumstances, e.g., misbehavior (R3).
The H-LTCA enforces a policy that each vehicle cannot ob-
tain tickets with overlapping lifetime: upon receiving a request,
the H-LTCA checks if a ticket was issued for the requester
during that period. This ensures that no vehicle can obtain more
than a single valid ticket to request multiple simultaneously
valid pseudonyms. Moreover, a ticket is implicitly bound to
a specific PCA; thus, it cannot be used more than once or be
reused for other PCAs. The PCA also issues the pseudonyms
with non-overlapping lifetimes; all in all, no vehicle can be
provided with more than one valid pseudonym at any time;
thus, Sybil-based misbehavior is thoroughly thwarted within a
multi-domain VC environment (R6). We achieve availability
TABLE IV
NOTATION USED IN SECURITY & PRIVACY ANALYSIS
PCAHi PCAi in the home domain
PCAH a set of PCAs in the home domain
PCAF a set of PCAs in the foreign domain
idH identities of the vehicles in the home domain
idF identities of the vehicles in the foreign domain
PH pseudonyms issued by the PCAs in the home domain
in the face of a crash failure by mandating load-balancers
and server redundancy [13]; in case of a DDoS attack, we
use a puzzle technique as a mitigation approach (R7), further
discussed in Sec. VI-B5.
The OBU could request pseudonyms for a period depending
on the policy, determined by the user (P1) or fixed by the VPKI
(P2 and P3). Based on the policy and the pseudonym lifetime,
the OBU automatically calculates the number of pseudonyms to
obtain. Clearly, there is a trade off: the longer the pseudonym
refill interval is, i.e., the higher the number of pseudonyms in
a single request is, the less frequent vehicle-VPKI interactions
are. But the higher the chance for a PCA to trivially link the
issued pseudonyms for the same vehicle as a response to a
single request. With our scheme, we can configure the system
to reduce the number of pseudonyms per request to one to
achieve full unlinkability, thus enhancing user privacy. To do
so, we configure the system with P3 so that ΓP3 is equal to τP ,
and have each vehicle requesting pseudonyms for a duration of
[ts, ts+τP ], i.e., obtaining a single pseudonym with a different
ticket. This implies that a PCA cannot link any two pseudonyms
issued for a single vehicle. But this configuration increases the
frequency of vehicle-VPKI interactions. The performance of
our VPKI to issue fully-unlinkable pseudonyms is evaluated
in Sec. VI-B3.
A. Honest-but-curious VPKI Servers
We further consider the privacy sensitive information that
can be inferred by colluding VPKI servers within the home
or across domains. Table III presents this information and the
privacy implications when different honest-but-curious VPKI
entities collude, based on notation summarized in Table IV.
A single entity cannot fully de-anonymize a user due to the
separation of duties in our design. Collusion by H-LTCA and
F-LTCAs, or PCAH and PCAF from the same or different
domains, do not reveal any useful information to link the
user identities with their pseudonyms. However, collusion by
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Fig. 2. Pseudonym acquisition policies (Each color shows the non-overlapping pseudonym lifetime).
H-LTCA and the PCAH enables them to link the vehicle
identities with their pseudonyms. Collusion by the F-LTCA
and the PCAF does not reveal the real identities of the vehicles,
but their pseudonyms and the foreign domain identifier.
Collusion by H-LTCA, F-LTCA and PCAF enables them to
link the issued pseudonyms with their long term identifiers.
Additionally, collusion by H-LTCA, F-LTCA, PCAH , and
PCAF results in linking the vehicle identities and their
corresponding pseudonyms in the home and foreign domains.
Finally, collusion of a vehicle and the H-LTCA, the F-LTCA,
or the PCA, could yield invalid IKn/f -tkt, IKn-tkt, or IKP iv ,
respectively.
B. Ticket and Pseudonym Lifetime Policies
Fig. 2 displays a transcript of eavesdropped pseudonyms
for different pseudonym acquisition policies (Γ=15 min, τP=5
min). We assume an LTCA, a PCA, or an external observer
attempts to link pseudonyms of the same vehicle based on the
timing information of the credentials. With P1 and P2 (Fig. 2.a
and 2.b), requests could act as user ‘‘fingerprints’’: the exact
time of requests and all subsequent requests until the end of
trip could be unique, or one of few, and thus linkable even by
an external observer as it might be unlikely in a specific region
to have multiple requests at a unique instance. In Fig. 2.a, the
pseudonym (colored in magenta) in row 2 expires at system
time 5 while the only pseudonym valid at time 5 is located
in row 5. Thus, an external observer could simply link these
two pseudonyms based on the pseudonym lifetimes. With
P2, not only an external observer could link two successive
pseudonyms of the same vehicle, but also a PCA could link
two sets of pseudonyms for the same requester based on the
timing information: in Fig. 2.b, the second pseudonym in row 8
(colored in magenta) is the last pseudonym issued for the first
iteration of ΓP2, which expires at system time 15. The only
pseudonym starting from 15 in the second iteration of ΓP2
is the second pseudonym in row 2 (with a repeated asterisk
pattern colored in magenta).
This vulnerability is thwarted by P3 (Fig. 2.c): the requesting
intervals fall within ‘‘universally’’ fixed interval (ΓP3) and
the issued pseudonyms are aligned with global system time
(PCA clock); thus, at any point in time all vehicles in a
given domain will be transmitting under pseudonyms which
are indistinguishable based on timing information alone. This
results in eliminating any distinction among pseudonym sets,
i.e., an anonymity set equal to the number of active requests.
Hence, not only an external observer, but also the PCA could
not distinguish among pseudonyms sets, thus, protecting user
privacy. The same policy should be applied for the ticket
acquisition, during which the H-LTCA fixes the timing interval
to be the same for all requesters; thus preventing an LTCA
from linking successive requests from a vehicle.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Without a large-scale deployment of VC systems, we resort
to realistic large-scale mobility traces. Based on these, we
determine the period the vehicles need pseudonyms. We extract
two features of interest from the mobility traces, i.e., the
departure time and the trip duration for each vehicle, and we
apply policies described in Sec. IV-B to create the workload for
the VPKI to assess the performance, i.e., scalability, efficiency,
and robustness, of the full-blown implementation of our VPKI
for a large-scale deployment. We evaluate performance with
two mobility traces and we only plot the results for both traces
and policies if they are significantly different than each other.
The main functionality of interest are: ticket and pseudonym
acquisition, CRL update, pseudonyms validation with OCSP,
and pseudonym resolution. The main metric is the end-to-
end pseudonym acquisition latency, i.e., the delay from the
initialization of protocol 1 till the successful completion of
protocol 2, measured at the vehicle.
A. Experimental Setup
VPKI Testbed and Detailed Implementation: We al-
locate Virtual Machines (VMs) for distinct VPKI servers.
Table V details the specification of the distinct servers and
the clients. Our full-blown implementation is in C++ and we
use FastCGI [44] to interface Apache web-server. We use
XML-RPC [45] to execute a remote procedure call on the
servers. Our VPKI interface is language-neutral and platform-
neutral as we use Protocol Buffers [46] for serializing and de-
serializing structured data. For the cryptographic protocols and
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TABLE V
SERVERS AND CLIENTS SPECIFICATIONS
LTCA PCA RA Client
Number of entities 1 1 1 1
Dual-core CPU (Ghz) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
BogoMips 4000 4000 4000 4000
Memory 2GB 2GB 1GB 1GB
Database MySQL MySQL MySQL MySQL
TABLE VI
MOBILITY TRACES INFORMATION
Tapas-Cologne LuST
Number of vehicles 75,576 138,259
Number of trips 75,576 287,939
Duration of snapshot (hour) 24 24
Available duration of snapshot (hour) 2 (6-8 AM) 24
Average trip duration (sec) 590.49 692.81
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Fig. 3. CDF of server processing delay for P1, LuST dataset.
primitives (ECDSA and TLS), we use OpenSSL with ECDSA-
256 public/private key pairs according to the standards [1,
5]; other algorithms and key sizes are compatible for our
implementation. We run our experiments in a testbed with both
servers and clients (emulating OBUs) running on the VMs:
this essentially eliminates the network propagation delays of
the vehicle-VPKI connectivity. As such a connectivity would
vary greatly based on the actual vehicle-VPKI connectivity,
we do not consider it here.
Mobility Traces: We use two microscopic vehicle mobility
datasets: Tapas-Cologne [47] and Luxembourg SUMO Traffic
(LuST) [48]. The former one represents the traffic demand
information across the Cologne urban area (available only for
2 hours, 6-8 AM), while the latter presents a full-day realistic
mobility pattern in the city of Luxembourg. Table VI shows
the mobility traces information for the two datasets.
Choice of Parameter: The choice of parameter for ΓP2/P3
and τP mainly determines the frequency of interaction with
the VPKI and the volume of workload imposed to the PCA:
the shorter the pseudonym lifetimes are, the greater number
of pseudonyms will be requested, thus a higher workload is
imposed on the PCA. We evaluate the overall performance of
the VPKI servers to issue pseudonyms with short lifetimes,
e.g., 60 sec, to investigate the behavior of the servers under a
high-workload condition.
B. VPKI Server Performance
1) Ticket and Pseudonym Provisioning: Fig. 3.a illustrates
the CDF of a single ticket issuance processing delay for the
Tapas dataset. For example, Fx(t = 4ms) = 0.95, or Pr{t ≤
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Fig. 4. Average end-to-end latency for different policies (Γ=10 min, τP =1
min). The first row (a, b), the second row (c, d), and the third row (e, f)
show the average end-to-end latency for user-controlled policy (P1), oblivious
policy (P2), and universally fixed policy (P3), respectively. The first column
represents the delays for Tapas dataset while the second one shows the delay
for LuST dataset.
TABLE VII
END-TO-END LATENCY STATISTICS
(Γ=10 MIN, τP =1 MIN).
Tapas-P1 Tapas-P2 Tapas-P3 LuST-P1 LuST-P2 LuST-P3
Maximum (ms) 296 320 5,168 3,062 248 5,545
Minimum (ms) 19 26 18 18 26 18
Average (ms) 50.29 45.56 42.76 51.78 47.58 43.10
Std. Deviation 16.26 12.10 26.19 35.40 11.72 23.53
Variance 264.35 146.5 685.83 1253.22 137.25 553.84
Pr{t ≤ x (ms)} = 0.99 102 83 69 110 80 70
4ms} = 0.95. Fig. 3.b shows the processing delay for issuing
pseudonyms with different lifetimes for Tapas dataset. As
illustrated, with τP=1 min, around 95% of requesters are served
less than 52 ms: Fx(t = 52ms) = 0.95, i.e., Pr{t ≤ 52ms} =
0.95. The results confirm the efficiency and scalability of our
system.
2) End-to-end Latency: We are primarily concerned with the
end-to-end latency, i.e., the delay for pseudonym acquisition,
measured at the vehicle, calculated from the initialization
of Protocol 1 till the successful completion of Protocol 2.3
Table VII details the latency statistics to obtain pseudonyms
with different policies for the two datasets. Figs. 4 show the
average latency for the vehicles with different pseudonym
3The processing time to generate the key pairs is not considered here as
the OBU can generate them off-line.
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TABLE VIII
LATENCY STATISTICS FOR DIFFERENT POLICIES, TAPAS DATASET (Γ=10 MIN)
Policy P1 P2 P3
Metrics Avg. E2Elatency (ms)
Avg. no.
of psnyms
Total no.
of psnyms
Avg. E2E
latency (ms)
Avg. no.
of psnyms
Total no.
of psnyms
Avg. E2E
latency (ms)
Avg. no.
of psnyms
Total no.
of psnyms
τP=30 (sec) 75.65 20.17 1,524,227 74.17 20 2,226,560 60.51 14.63 2,196,277
τP=60 (sec) 50.29 10.33 781,060 45.56 10 1,113,280 42.76 7.47 995,291
τP=120 (sec) 44.26 5.42 409,355 40.70 5 556,640 35.07 3.85 578,099
τP=180 (sec) 41.56 3.77 285,359 —— —— —— —— —— ——
τP=240 (sec) 35.20 2.96 223,578 —— —— —— —— —— ——
τP=300 (sec) 35.21 2.46 186,116 33.86 2 222,656 32.19 1.70 255,384
τP=360 (sec) 34.62 2.13 161,211 —— —— —— —— —— ——
τP=420 (sec) 33.40 1.90 143,498 —— —— —— —— —— ——
τP=480 (sec) 32.17 1.72 125,074 —— —— —— —— —— ——
τP=540 (sec) 31.74 1.58 119,481 —— —— —— —— —— ——
τP=600 (sec) 31.63 1.47 111,237 32.23 1 111,328 31.63 1 150,071
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Fig. 5. End-to-end latency comparison for different policies (Tapas dataset).
acquisition policies. With P1 (Figs. 4.a and 4.b), each vehicle
requests all required pseudonyms at once. With τ=1 min, 99%
of the requesters for the Tapas and LuST datasets are served
within less than 102 ms and 110 ms respectively. As we see,
there are some sudden jumps in Fig. 4.b: the principal reason
is that P1 allows vehicles to request pseudonyms for any trip
duration; thus, long trip durations result in requesting more
pseudonyms at once.
With P2 (Figs. 4.c and 4.d), vehicles request a fixed amount
of pseudonyms every time (for a duration of ΓP2=10 min),
thus never overloading the PCA server with a large amount
of pseudonyms in a single request; this results in low standard
deviation and variance, and a smoother average delay in
comparison to P1. The average end-to-end latency for Tapas
and LuST datasets (τP=1 min) is 46 ms and 48 ms respectively;
accordingly, 99% of vehicles are served within less than 83
ms and 80 ms respectively.
With P3 (Fig. 4.e and 4.f), the system enforces synchronized
batch arrivals to obtain pseudonyms: each vehicle requests
pseudonyms for the entire ΓP3, timely aligned with the rest.
99% of the vehicles for the two datasets are served within less
than 69 ms and 70 ms respectively. This confirms that the
most promising policy in terms of privacy protection incurs
even lower overhead in compare to other policies. All in all,
TABLE IX
END-TO-END LATENCY STATISTICS
WITH P3 (ΓP3=1 MIN, τP =1 MIN)
Maximum (ms) Minimum (ms) Average (ms) Std. Deviation Variance Pr{t ≤ x (ms)} = 0.99
Tapas 6,462 17 34.72 24.69 609.39 86
LuST 5,043 19 34.72 21.52 462.92 54
our secure and privacy preserving scheme efficiently issues
pseudonyms for the requesters and an OBU can initiate a
request for pseudonyms within the lifetime of the last single
valid pseudonym.
Fig. 5 and Table VIII show a comparison of the average end-
to-end latency for different pseudonym acquisition policies. P3
incurs the lowest delay among the three policies: for example,
the average end-to-end latency for P1, P2, and P3, with τP=60
sec is 50, 46, and 43 ms respectively. With P1, each vehicle
requests all the required pseudonyms at once, which results
in a higher workload on the PCA, thus higher latency. In
other words, for P2 and P3, a request with large number of
pseudonyms is split into multiple requests, each with fewer
pseudonyms, thus achieving better performance due to the
parallelization in multi-core processors.
Furthermore, the average end-to-end latency with P3 is lower
than that with P2: the reason is that, with P3, each vehicle
requests pseudonyms only for the ‘‘current’’ ΓP3; this results
in the acquisition of only non-expired pseudonyms for the
residual trip duration; while, with P2, each vehicle requests
pseudonyms for an entire ΓP2, out of which all pseudonyms are
actually obtained. This is why the average end-to-end latency
with P3 is lower than that with P2 (assuming ΓP2 = ΓP3).
3) Fully-unlinkable Pseudonym Provisioning: Table IX
details the latency statistics to obtain pseudonyms with P3
(ΓP3 = τP = 1 min). The cumulative probability of end-to-end
latency for Tapas and LuST datasets is: Pr{t ≤ 86ms} = 0.99,
and Pr{t ≤ 54ms} = 0.99 respectively. With this probability,
one can be fairly assured that even under this seemingly
extreme configuration, the system is workable, i.e., the servers
can issue fully unlinkable pseudonyms for the requesters.
Nonetheless, there are rare events where the latency jumps;
this indicates that either we need to enhance servers processing
power, or trade it off by requesting small sets of linkable
pseudonyms.
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Fig. 6. Pseudonym utilization, LuST dataset for P2 and P3.
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Fig. 7. The VPKI servers are under a DDoS attack: overhead to obtain
pseudonyms for LuST dataset with P1 (difficulty level: L=5, τP = 5 min).
4) Optimal Pseudonym Utilization: Using P1, each vehicle
interacts with the VPKI servers once to obtain the necessary
pseudonyms for the entire trip duration (ideally without over-
provisioning). However, according to P2 and P3, vehicles
could be potentially equipped with more pseudonyms than
necessary, i.e., the PCA might issue pseudonyms that the
vehicle will not use them. Fig. 6 shows the average number
of unused pseudonyms for LuST datasets with P2 and P3.
In general, the longer the pseudonym refill interval Γ, i.e.,
ΓP2/P3, and the shorter pseudonym lifetime (τP ) are, the
less frequent the vehicle-VPKI interactions but the higher the
chance to overprovision a vehicle. In other words, the longer
the Γ intervals and the τP are, the less the average number of
unused pseudonyms is, thus the higher pseudonym utilization.
For example, the average number of unused pseudonyms with
P2 and P3, when Γ is 5 min and τP is 30 sec, is 4.7 and
4.9 respectively; this implies that under these configurations,
each vehicle on average is issued approximately 5 unused
pseudonyms. The flip side is that this would allow the PCA
to have each set of pseudonyms (as a result of each request)
trivially linked.
5) DDoS Attack: Internal adversaries could mount a clog-
ging DoS attack. A rate limiting mechanism prevents internal
adversaries from affecting the system performance; moreover,
the system flags the legitimate but misbehaving users, thus
evicting them from the system. External adversaries could
launch a DDoS attack by clogging the LTCA with faked
certificates, or the PCA with bogus tickets.
To gauge the availability of the system, we evaluate the
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Fig. 9. End-to-end latency to resolve and revoke a pseudonym.
average system latency to issue pseudonyms under a DDoS
attack. We performed the experiments for different policies with
various pseudonym lifetimes for the two datasets; we realized
that the choice of policy, pseudonym lifetime, or dataset do not
have a direct effect on the results; thus, we show the results for
the LuST dataset, as it represents a full-day scenario, with P1
and τ=5 min. We increase the rate of adversarial requests up
to 1,000 req/sec. As illustrated in Fig. 7, the average latency
rapidly increases when the faked requests reach 1,000 req/sec.
We use the guided tour puzzle [49] with difficulty level (L) 5 as
a DDoS mitigation technique to prevent the external adversaries
from overflowing the servers with spurious requests. Using
this mechanism, the power of an attacker is degraded to the
power of a legitimate client; thus, an attacker cannot send
high-rate spurious requests to the servers. Therefore, the attack
is mitigated while the overhead to obtain pseudonyms for the
legitimate vehicles increases only by approximately 50 ms.
C. Revocation Update
Fig. 8 shows the CDF of latencies for obtaining a CRL and
the average latency to perform OCSP validation for the LuST
dataset. With a modest VM dedicated for the PCA server,
the results confirm the scalability of our system: 95% of the
requesters to fetch a CRL with 100,000 revoked pseudonym
are served within less than 1,500 ms, and the latencies for
OCSP validation with 500 pseudonyms never exceeds 75 ms.
D. Pseudonym Revocation and Resolution
Fig. 9 shows the latency for each system component to
resolve and revoke a pseudonym within a single domain
(Fig. 9.a) and across domains (Fig. 9.b). We evaluate resolution
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with different number of pseudonyms in the PCA database
(from 10,000 to 5,000,000 pseudonyms). Unlike another
scheme [22] in which the performance is affected by increasing
the number of revoked pseudonyms, our implementation is not.
Our scheme outperforms other schemes, e.g., resolving and
revoking a pseudonym in [23] takes more than 2 sec while
with the same system configuration, it takes approximately 100
ms in our implementation.
TABLE X
LATENCY FOR ISSUING 100 PSEUDONYMS
(WITHOUT COMMUNICATION DELAY)
Delaypca CPUpca
VeSPA [21] 817 ms 3.4 GHz (dual-core)
SEROSA [23] 650 ms 2.0 GHz (dual-core)
PUCA [25] 1,000 ms 2.53 GHz (dual-core)
PRESERVE PKI (Fraunhofer SIT) [10] ≈ 4,000 ms N/A
C2C-CC PKI (ESCRYPT) [6] 393 ms N/A
SECMACE 260 ms 2.0 GHz (dual-core)
E. Comparison with Other Implementations
There are a few schemes with performance evaluation of their
implementations. A direct comparison among these schemes
based on the available information is not straightforward.
However, to highlight the essential need to the experimental
validation and to ensure the viability as the system scales up,
Table X demonstrates the latency for issuing 100 pseudonyms
in different schemes4. The results confirm a significant perfor-
mance improvement of our scheme over prior works: a 3-fold
improvement over VeSPA [21], a 2.5-fold improvement over
SEROSA [23] and a 4-fold improvement over PUCA [25].
VII. CONCLUSION
Paving the way for the deployment of a secure and privacy-
preserving VC system has been started; standardization bodies
and harmonization efforts have consensus towards deploying
a special-purpose identity and credential management system.
However, its success requires effective security and privacy-
preserving protocols to guarantee the operations of the VC
systems. To address the existing challenges, we proposed
SECMACE, a novel VPKI that improves upon prior art in
terms of security and privacy protection, and efficiency, and
it provides solid evidence through a detailed implementation;
we proposed three pseudonym acquisition policies, one of
which protects user privacy to a greater extent while the timing
information cannot harm user privacy. We further provide a
full-blown implementation of our system and we evaluated
our scheme with real mobility traces to confirm its efficiency,
scalability, and robustness. Through extensive experimental
evaluation, we demonstrated that modest VMs dedicated for
the servers can serve on-demand requests with very low delay,
and the most promising policy in terms of privacy protection
incurs moderate overhead. This supports that the deployment
of VPKI facilities can be cost-effective.
4We emphasize that the results of the PRESERVE PKI are for VMs with
shared resources. Thus, the latency should not be directly compared to that
for other systems. We include it here only for completeness.
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